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ABSTRACT
Attackers can easily avoid traditional detection methods by reorder-
ing the malware code or inserting useless code. To address the
costs of reverse engineering and signature extraction, the advanced
research on malware detection focuses on using neural networks
to learn malicious behaviors with static and dynamic features. The
advantage of those approaches is they can achieve high detection
accuracy and shorten the time between a malware report and de-
ployed detection. However, deep learning-based malware detection
models are vulnerable to a hack from adversarial samples. The
attackers’ goal is to generate imperceptible perturbations to the
original samples and evade detection. In the context of malware,
the generated samples should have one more important character:
it should not change the malicious behaviors of the original code.
So the original features can not be removed and changed.
In this paper, we proposed a reinforcement learning based attack
to deceive graph based malware detection models. Inspired by ob-
fuscation techniques, the central idea of the proposed attack is to
sequentially inject semantic Nops , which will not change the pro-
gram’s functionality, into CFGs(Control Flow Graph). Specifically,
the Semantics-preserving Reinforcement Learning(SRL) Attack is
to learn a RL agent to iteratively select the semantic Nops and in-
sert them into basic blocks of the CFGs. Variants of obfuscation
methods, hill-climbing methods and gradient based algorithms are
proposed: 1) Semantics-preserving Random Insertion(SRI) Attack:
randomly inserting semantic Nops into basic blocks.; 2) Semantics-
preserving Accumulated Insertion(SAI) Attack: declining certain
random transformation according to the probability of the target
class; 3) Semantics-preserving Gradient based Insertion(SGI) At-
tack: applying transformation on the original CFG in the direction
of the gradient. We use real-world Windows programs to show that
a family of Graph Neural Network models are vulnerable to these
attacks. The best evasion rate of the benchmark attacks are 97% on
the basic GCN model and 96% on DGCNN model. The SRL attack
can achieve 100% on both models.
1 INTRODUCTION
Both the industry and the academic communities have provided
approaches to detect malware with program analysis. Traditional
methods such as behavior-based signatures, dynamic taint tracking,
and static data flow analysis require experts to manually investigate
unknown files and locate the malicious behaviors [24]. However,
those approaches are not effective with the large-scale malware
variants. Attackers can specifically morph their malware using
various obfuscation techniques such as code encryption, reordering
the program instructions and dead code insertion technique to
avoid detection based on the analysis of malware detection tools.
To detectmalware variants, graph-based deep learning algorithms[20,
45, 50] have been studied. Graph-based deep learning algorithms
can not only learn the representative embedding of the graph,
but also automatically detect unseen malicious files. The most
prominent use case of GNN (Graph Neural Network) classifier
in the malware detection domain is analyzing control flow graph
as features[45]. The CFG-represented data exploits structural and
instruction-level information in the underlying malware programs.
The semantics of a malware program is incorporated in the instruc-
tion list of the basic blocks and the structural dependencies defined
by the connected edges. Various studies have shown that seman-
tics of programs is a representative feature to trace the malware
variants[10, 46, 49].
Nevertheless, deep learning based models are susceptible to ad-
versarial attacks. For example, adversarial examples that enable
attackers to deceive the GNN models[13], circumvent the face-
recognition models[35], and fool the voice recognition systems[48].
More and more deep learning applications in the security related
domain attract attackers to manipulate the malware to mislead the
deep learning based malware detection model.
The goal of adversarial attacks is to force the detection model to
misclassify malicious programs as benign. There have been numer-
ous research focused on attacking deep learning based malware
detection model. Some of them evade the deep neural networks
by modifying the original binary such as PE header metadata and
Section metatdata[4, 21–23, 33, 36, 37, 44]. Some works morph the
extracted features of the malicious programs like API calls[34] to
evade detection models. However, little research has been con-
ducted on attacking graph structured malware detection model.
Existing work on adversarial malware generation does not preserve
the functionality of original programs[2]. They directly apply the
gradient of the neural networks on extracted continuous features
of original CFG. The generated samples may change the programs’
functionality. For example, the intended function of a trojan, such as
accessing users’ passwords, deleting users’ files, and infecting other
devices through the network connection, should not be removed to
evade the detection. The malicious functionality must be preserved
for an adversarial sample. This constraint means the original fea-
tures leveraged in deep learning models can not be removed and
altered. In addition, inserting new features may also break the pro-
gramâĂŹs functionality. For instance, the intended function may
be jumped if we insert a ‘JMP’ instruction in the original CFG.Thus,
it is essential to choose semantics-preserving transformations on
original malware to preserve the malicious functionalities of ad-
versarial samples. Generally, to conduct this research, we have to
overcome the following challenges:
• The features in the graph structure involves in discrete data,
so we can not directly leverage gradient-based attacks to
generate infinitesimal small perturbation to original graph.
• The generated samples should not change the original pro-
gram behaviors, which indicates attackers can not remove
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original features and should be caution to insert new fea-
tures.
To overcome the challenges, we proposed a novel method to
automatically generate adversarial samples for CFG-based malware
detection models incorporating the constraint of preserving func-
tionality. We designed a reinforcement learning based approach,
namely the Semantics-preserving Reinforcement Learning(SRL) at-
tack, to select the semanticNops , which will not change the original
behaviors, and insert them into the original CFGs.We first extracted
CFGs from 8,000 benign and malicious real-world Windows pro-
grams and construct abstract directed graphs to represent the CFGs.
Then we applied two graph-based models, the basic GCNmodel[20]
and the DGCNN model[50], to classify the graphs. The SRL attack
is compared with three attacks: the Semantics-preserving Random
Insertion(SRI) attack inspired by obfuscation methods[9, 26, 47],
the Semantics-preserving Accumulated Insertion(SAI) attack in-
spired by hill-climbing methods[36], and the Semantics-preserving
Gradient based Insertion(SGI) attack inspired by FGSM attacks[17].
We observe the existing attacks are limited in evading graph neural
networks for malware detection. The experiments’ results demon-
strate that SRI methods are able to achieve an evasion rate of 45%
on the basic GCN models and 72% on the DGCNN models. The SGI
attack can fool the basic GCN model with a success rate near 41%
and deceive the DGCNN models with evasion rate 83%. The SAI
attacks can achieve an evasion rate on both models for more than
90%. The SRL attack can deceive two models with 100% success
rate. We added the adversarial samples and retrain the detection
models to defend against those attacks. The retrained models can
achieve similar accuracy and the evasion rate of some attacks re-
duced significantly.
The contributions of our paper are as follows:
• We have a key observation that is the existing black-box and
white-box attacks against GNNs can not be directly launched
against malware detection models. If directly launched, they
would violate the semantics preserving requirement. This
is the first work on semantic preserving black-box attacks
against GNNs malware detection models.
• Wepropose a reinforcement learning based semantics-preserving
attack against black-box GNNs for malware detection.
• Using several GNNs, we evaluated and demonstrated the
effectiveness of the proposed method via intensive experi-
ments with different settings. We built a baseline with three
attacks on the basis of existing methods to against GNNs for
malware detection.
In section 2, we review some background of malware detection
and graph neural networks. The threat model and problem state-
ment are illustrated in section 3. The four practical approaches
for generating adversarial samples are described in section 4. The
performance of the proposed approaches is in section 5. In section
6, we introduce related works on adversarial generation. Finally,
the conclusion and future work are discussed in section 7.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a backgroud of malware detection meth-
ods, graph neural networks and code obfuscation methods.
2.1 Malware Detection
Malware detection models primarily make use of analysis tech-
niques to understand the intention of malware. Features leveraged
in malware detection can be grouped into three categories: static
features, dynamic features, and hybrid features. Static features are
extracted without running the executable files. Dynamic features
are extracted by analyzing the behaviors of a program while it is
being executed in a simulated and monitored environment. Hybrid
features combine both static and dynamic features.
Researchers have applied conventional machine learning algo-
rithms (e.g., SVM) and deep learning method to detect malware.
Various approaches are deployed to extract static features. Some
of them make use of the binary file itself as indicators to detect
the malware[11, 32]. The characteristics of the binary files, such
as PE import features, metadata, and strings, are also ubiquitously
applied in malware detection[14]. Others leverage reverse engineer-
ing to understand the programs’ architecture. Reverse engineering
is employed to disassemble the program to extract high-level repre-
sentation, including instruction-flow- graph, control flow graphs,
call-graph, and opcode sequences[14, 25, 43].
Dynamic analysis executes the programs in a virtual environ-
ment to monitor their behaviors and observe their functionality.
Features obtained by dynamic analysis are API calls, system calls,
registry changes, memory writes, network patterns, etc[12, 27, 39].
Dynamic analysis can address some obfuscated malware and hence
provide more accurate programs’ behaviors. In line with the static
analysis, attackers adopt approaches to prevent malware from dy-
namic analysis[19]. The malware starts an early check and im-
mediately exits if it runs on virtual machines. Even worse, some
of malware execute benign behaviors so humans draw incorrect
conclusions about the intent of the malware.
Convolutional neural networks and fully connected dense lay-
ers are leveraged to learn the high level features out of the se-
lected features[11, 25, 32]. For sequential data such as API calls
and instruction sequence, RNN models are applied to classify the
malware [27, 34, 39]. Recently some researchers use graph neural
networks to classify malware programs represented as control flow
graphs[45].
2.2 Graph Neural networks
Some papers have investigated the resilience of malware detection
model that use deep neural networks, such as CNN architecture,
with features selected from raw bytes as input[21, 22, 37]. The ro-
bustness of the recurrent neural networks (RNNs) are also analyzed
for sequential data[18, 34]. In this work, we study attacks targeting
malware detection models built from CFG-represented data. The
structure information contained by CFGs can be used to find un-
reachable code, find syntactic structure (like loops), and predict
programs’ defect[24, 31].
To embed structural information inherent in graph like data, we
use two graph neural network: the basic GCN model[20] and the
DGCNN model[50]. In alignment with the DGCNN model[50], our
graph convolution layer takes the following propagation rule:
Hl+1 = σ (D˜−1A˜HlW ) (1)
Here, A˜ = A + I is the adjacency matrix A of the directed graph G
with added self-connections I . D˜ii =
∑
j A˜i j is its diagonal degree
matrix.W is a layer-specific trainable weight matrix. σ (·) is a non-
linear activation function. Hl is the matrix of activations in the l-th
layer; H0 = X , where X denotes the node information matrix of
graph G.
The graph convolutional layer propagates node features to neigh-
boring nodes as well as the node itself to extract local substructure
information. We stack multiple graph convolution layers to get
high-level substructure features. For the basic GCN model, we add
a classification layer after node embedding to extract graph features.
The classification layer simply flattens the high-level substructure
features and adds a fully-connected layer followed by a nonlinear
activation function. For another model, we follow the same archi-
tectures as the DGCNNmodel [50]. First, we concatenate the output
of multiple GCN layers. Then, we use the SortPooling layer to sort
the features followed by 1-D convolutional layers and dense layer
to learn the graph-level features.
2.3 Code Obfuscation
Code obfuscation tools serve two main purposes: (1) to protect in-
tellectual properties; (b) to evade malware detection systems. There
are a variety of code obfuscation schemes. A basic requirement is
that the program semantics must be preserved after the code is
transformed by such tools. Traditionally, attackers use obfuscation
methods, including dead-code insertion, register reassignment, sub-
routine reordering, instruction substitution and so on, to morph
their malware to evade malware detection[9, 26, 47]. Here we list
the definition of some typical obfuscation methods:
• Semantic nops insertion: inserting certain ineffective instruc-
tions to the original binary without changing its behavior,
such as nop;
• Register reassignment: switching registers while keeping
the program code and its behavior same, such as changing
registers EAX in the binary are reassigned to EBX ;
• Subroutine reordering: changing the order of subroutines in
one binary in a random way;
• Instruction substitution: replacing some instructions with
other equivalent ones, such as in some cases, xor can be
replaced with sub;
• Code transposition: reordering the sequence of the instruc-
tions of a binary;
The recent research findings on the existence and effectiveness
of adversarial examples indicate that the evasion ability of code
obfuscation tools should be examined in the context of the existing
adversarial attacks. Attacks on deep learningmodels can be grouped
into three scenarios: 1) In the white-box scenarios, the adversaries
have full knowledge of the target DL model;2) In the gray-box
scenarios, they have access to the structure of the DL models;3)
In the black-box scenarios, they can only query the DL models
to get the confidence value or the prediction label. Attacks on
the white-box attack are generally based on the gradient of the
neural network. Meanwhile, in the black-box/gray-box scenarios,
the adversary morphs adversarial examples by following white-box
attack strategies on a local model or a surrogate model[6]. However,
the infinitesimal small perturbation generated by gradient-based
attacks can not be directly applied to our target model because the
graph structured data involves in discrete value.
Code obfuscation is effective to evade the signature-based detec-
tion system because it could significantly change the syntactic of
original malware. Although code obfuscation tools have enabled at-
tackers to successfully evade various real-world malware detection
systems, the unique capabilities of deep learning models, especially
graph neural networks, indicate that the evasion ability of code
obfuscation tools can no longer be taken for granted.
The experiments in our paper demonstrate that randomly in-
serting dead instruction can not achieve a good result compared to
other attacks with the help of prediction confidence or gradients.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, our goal is to conduct the first study on the re-
silience of deep learning-based detection models trained over CFG-
represented malware. The overarching research question is: can
we leverage the blind spots of the deep learning algorithms to
guide attackers use code obfuscation method to modify the mal-
ware and evade the detection model? The objective of this paper is
to apply code obfuscation method, specifically semantic nops , on
CFG-represented malware to evade graph neural networks on the
guidance of potential shortcomings of the deep learning algorithms.
3.1 CFG-based Analysis
A control flow graph(CFG) is a directed graph representation that
illustrates all reachable paths of the program during execution . The
nodes of the CFG are the basic blocks of the program. Each basic
block is a consecutive, single-entry code without any branching
except at end of the sequence. Edges in a CFG represent possible
control flow in the program. Control enters only at the beginning
of the basic block and leaves only at the end of the basic block. Each
basic block can have multiple incoming/outgoing edges. Each edge
corresponds to a potential program execution.
We abstract a basic block only by its opcodes, ignoring all operands.
For example, sub %eax ,%ebx and sub [%ecx],%edx would be both
represented by sub. First, some instructions, such as JMP and INC ,
share the same bytes, but they have different semantic meanings.
Second, the operands or instruction values result in large syntactic
differences, e.g. different registers being used, but the semantic
meaning of those instructions can be considered as similar. We
argue that the semantics of the binary is more effective in malware
detection. So for each basic block, we use the opcodes such asMOV ,
ADD or JMP as features of the instruction.
After extracting CFG from the executable files, we will construct
an abstract directed graph G =< V ,E >, consisting of the set V of
nodes and the set E of edges. Each node vi represents a basic block
in a CFG, while a directed edge ei j points from the first basic block
vi to the second basic block vj . We brought the concepts of Bag-of-
words (BoW) in NLP to vectorize the basic blocks. First, we map n
opcodes of the x86 instruction set to a list S = {s1, s2, ..., sn }, where
si is a particular opcode. For a basic blockvi in a CFGG =< V ,E >,
each occurrence of the opcodes in the basic block vi is counted,
and is transformed as an array of integer counts with size same as
S . Let vi = {x1...xn }, a vector of counts over each opcode. xk is
set as the occurrence if the k-th opcode exists in the basic block,
otherwise, it is set as 0.
In the context of the adversarial malware generation, we can not
directly change edges in the graph. To preserve the functionality
of the malware, in this paper, the manipulation on the malware
is limited to semantic nops insertion. We define a list of semantic
nops that will not affect the program functionally, and also will not
change the structure of the original CFG.
In the black-box setting, the attackers can only receive the fi-
nal probability result from the malware detection models. The
goal of the attackers is to mislead the malware detection model C.
Specifically, the adversarial samples generated from malware are
misclassified as benign programs. A malicious CFG G =< V ,E >
can be correctly labeled as a malware by the pretrained and fixed
malware detection model. The goal is to safely manipulate the basic
blocks and generate an adversarial graph G˜ =< V˜ ,E > to deceive
the detection model C.
3.2 Problem Statement
We formulate the proposed attacks as follows. Let G =< V ,E > be
a given graph, where V ∈ Rm×n and E ∈ Rm×m , wherem is the
number of nodes and n is the number of opcodes in the instruc-
tion set. The semantic nops are encoded using the aforementioned
method in Section 3.1. The manipulation on malware is a small
and imperceptible perturbations that should not change the pro-
gram’s original functionality. We define a list of dead instructions
ζ ∈ RI×D , where I is the number of dead instructions. By selecting
and inserting the dead instructions into the original sample G, we
generate an adversarial sample G˜ =< V + δ ,E >. The adversarial
sample has the same graph structure as the original sample. Our
attacks aims to maximize the probability of the target label under
the constraints that at most ∆ instructions can be injected. An ad-
versarial example is generated by solving the following constrained
optimization problem:
G˜ =minC(G˜, y˜;θ );
s .t . d(G, G˜) ≤ ∆ (2)
where y˜ is the target label, C(·) is the detection model with param-
eters θ , and d(·) is the distance function to calculate the number of
injected instructions.
4 ATTACKS ON GRAPH BASED MALWARE
DETECTION MODEL
Four Semantics-preserving attacks against GNN for malware de-
tection are proposed. We first describe the semantics-preserving
reinforcement learning(SRL) attack and discusses the technical
approach behind the proposed attack to solve the optimization
problem in Eq. 2. Next, we show the other semantic-preserving at-
tacks, each of which is designed using the existing ideas including
random insertion, hill-climbing approach, gradient-based insertion
methods.
4.1 Semantics-preserving Reinforcement
Learning(SRL) Attack
The key factor of adversarial malware generation via semantic
nops injection is to select the appropriate semantic nops and their
corresponding basic blocks. The decision making process involves
in discrete value. Thus, we can not directly apply gradient based
attack to inject semantic nops . Reinforcement learning can be a
valid approach to attack graph neural networks by modify the
graph structure and node features[13, 38]. We propose a semantics-
preserving reinforcement learning attack by sequentially injecting
semantic nops into the CFGs.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the SRL attack train a deep reinforce-
ment learning agent which could iteratively choose basic blocks
and dead instructions to modify the malicious input until it can
successfully mislead the detection model. The model can be viewed
as a Finite Horizon Markov Decision Process(MDP)M(C,G, S,A,R).
It contains a detection model C, a malicious inputG , the state space
S , the action set A, and the reward R. First, a CFG is represented
as a state s0. Then for each turn t , the RL agent choose an action
at ∈ 𝒜 based on a policy π (a |st ) to decide which dead instruc-
tion should be inserted into the observable environmental state
vector st . Also, to determine the basic blocks vt that will be ma-
nipulated each iterate, the RL agent will sort the importance of
basic blocks in the graph to pick up topk basic blocks. With those
decision, we will get a new state which will be sent to the detection
model C to get the rewards rt ∈ R of the actions. This process
repeats at most niter iterations. With the action at and the sorted
list of the basic blocks vt , the trajectory of the proposed MDP is
(s0,a0,v0, r0, s1, ..., st−1,at−1,vt−1, rt−1, st ). The rewards then will
be used to update the RL agent.
We design reinforcement learning environment and reward to
solve the optimization problem in Eq. 2 as follows:
• State:
The state st at time t represent a partially modified CFG
Gt =< Vt ,E > with some of the manipulated basic blocks.
• Action:
Each action includes two folds: 1) the importance of the basic
blocks vt ; 2) a dead instruction at . The action space of pick-
ing up a dead instruction is O(I ), where I is the numbers of
semantic nops . Similar to [36], below is the rule we followed
to generate the semantic nops:
– Some atomic instructions that do not change the memory
or register value, e.g. NOP .
– An invertible instruction, such as arithmetic operation
and logical operation, followed by the inverse instruction,
e.g. PUSH and POP , ADD and SUB.
• Reward:
The ultimate goal of the reinforcement learning model is
to generate new samples that can misclassify the detection
model. In practice, the decision process will be long to find
the right action during training process. Thus, we calculate
the rewards of each state as an intermediate feedback. If
one CFG can successfully evade detection, the reward rt is
associated with the action sequence length. We design the
guiding reward rt to be one if it can increase the possibility
pst ,at ,vt = C(st ,at ,vt , y˜) of successfully evading the predic-
tion model and be recognized as the target label y˜, and to be
zero vice versa.
rt (st ,at ,vt ) =
{
1; i f pst ,at ,vt > pst−1,at−1,vt−1
0; otherwise . (3)
𝑠!
RL	Agent
… …
𝑠!"#
Reward
GCN
Figure 1: The architecture of the SRL Attack
• Terminal:
Once the injected instructions reaches to the budget ∆, or
current state can be misclassifed, the process stops. The
generated samples contains at most niter new instructions
compared to the original sample.
Algorithm 1: Semantics-preserving Reinforcement Learning
attack against malware detection
Input: C(·), y˜, NopsList , topk , niters , ∆, q
Initialize Q(s,a,v) with random parameters θ ;
Set target function Qˆ with parameters θ− = θ ;
Initialize replay memory bufferℳ;
queries ← 0;
for each G =< V ,E > do
t ← 0 ;
G˜ ← G ;
while argmax(C(G˜)) , y˜ and t < niters do
Choose at and vt based on Eq.6 and Eq. 7;
Insert the action at from NopsList into topk basic
block sorted by vt to get new graph G ′ as st+1;
Compute r based on Eq. 3;
Store {st ,at ,vt , rt , st+1} in memoryℳ;
if queries%q = 0 then
Sample minibatch transitions fromℳ based on
Eq. 8 and Eq.9;
Update parameters according to Eq.10;
end
if Di f f (G ′,G) <= ∆ then
G˜ ← G ′;
else
t = niter
end
t ← t + 1;
queries ← q + 1;
end
end
As other work on adversarial graph generation[13], the pol-
icy network used to learn the MDP in this paper is Q-learning.
Q-learning is an off-policy control algorithm and fits Bellman opti-
mality equation as bellow:
Q(st ,at ) = r (st ,at ) + γ max
a′
Q(st+1,a′) (4)
In our case, it is adopted as bellow:
Q(st ,at ,vt ) = r (st ,at ,vt ) + γ max
a′
Q(st+1,a′,v ′) (5)
The goal of the RL agent is to learn a policy model π (st ,at ,vt )
and a action-value function Q(st ,at ,vt ). To score the nodes in the
graph and insert the dead instruction in the sorted basic blocks,
we first use the same structure as the DGCNN model to embed the
graph. The result of the SortPooling layer is obtained to select topk
basic blocks. Then the agent calculate the Q value based on the Q
function as:
Q(st ,at ,vt ;θ ) =W1σ (W2[µ(e(st ))]) (6)
where θ represents the trainable weights of the DQN, e(st ) is the
embedding of graph st . We use greedy policy to select the action
at estimated by the Q function:
π (at ,vt |st ;Q) = argmax
a∈ζ
Q(st ,a,v ;θ ) (7)
We use the prioritized experience replay technique with memory
buffer ℳ to train the DQN. The buffer records past experience
denoted as (st ,at , rt , s(t+1), |δt |)with states, actions taken at those
states, the rewards and the next state and its absolute TD error.
During training, we draw past experiences for a given minibatch
from the memory bufferℳ with probability P(i):
P(i) = p
α
i∑
k p
α
k
(8)
The priorities pi of an experience i were set as:
pi = |δi | + ϵ (9)
where ϵ is a small constant to ensure that samples with a low δi
have some non-zero probability of being drawn. The Q-learning
loss function is as follow:
E(st ,at ,vt ,rt ,st+1)∼D [(rt + γ maxa∈ζ Qˆθ− (st+1,a,v) −Qθ (st ,at ,vt )
2]
(10)
The Q-learning algorithm is shown in procedural form in Algo-
rithm 1. For each malicious CFG, it choose topk basic blocks and
one semantic nop in the list of semantic nops . The transformation
will be applied to the original graph G. Then we can obtain the
reward with the generated graph G ′ and store the current state,
actions , rewards and next state to the memory bufferℳ. Every
q queries, it will sample a minibatch from the memory buffer and
train the Q function. The algorithm repeats until it reaches to niters
iterations, the inserted features is more than the defined budget ∆,
or the generated samples can be misclassified as the target label y˜.
4.2 Other attacking methods
We introduce Semantics-preserving Random Insertion(SRI) Attack
in Sec. 4.2.1 and Semantics-preserving Accumulated Insertion(SAI)
Attack in Sec. 4.2.2. Variant of gradientmethods, Semantics-preserving
Gradient based Insertion(SGI) Attack, is proposed in Sec. 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Semantics-preserving Random Insertion(SRI) Attack. The
attack iteratively modifies a malicious CFG until it can be misclas-
sified as a benign program or reach to the maximum number of
iterations.
Algorithm 2 presents the pseudocode of the SRI attack. In each
iteration, it first randomly choose topk basic blocks in the CFG
G =< V ,E >, and then pick up one dead instruction in the list of
semantic nops . After that, it will insert the dead instruction into
those basic blocks. To limit the numbers of manipulation on original
CFG, the difference between the generated CFG and the original
CFG should less than the defined ∆. The algorithm repeats up to
niters iterations. The manipulated graph is an adversarial sample
if it is misclassified as the target label y˜. To perform the SRI attack,
the attackers do not require the additional information about the
architectures, the weights, and the predicted probability of malware
detection models. Also, attackers can constrain the times of probing
the detection models niters and the number of effected basic blocks
topk . Attackers may be noticed if it queries the detection model too
much times.
4.2.2 Semantics-preserving Accumulated Insertion(SAI) Attack.
Instead of directly transforming the original binary with the ran-
dom decision as Algorithm 2, SAI algorithm follows a hill-climbing
approach[36]. It declines some decisions if the probability of the
target class reduces.
For each CFG, it first probes the detection model C(·) to retrieve
the probability p of the target class. Then, in each iteration, it
randomly chooses topk basic blocks and one dead instruction in a
list of semantic nops NopsList . It will query the detection model
using the transformed CFG G ′ =< V˜ ,E > to obtain the changed
probability of the target class p′. And it accepts the transformation
only if the probability increases. Similar to the SRI attack, SAI
attack can also limit the number of effected basic blocks in each
iteration and the number of total inquiries. The manipulation on
original CFG should also less than ∆. However, attackers require
the predicted probability of the targeted model to apply the SAI
attack.
4.2.3 Semantics-preserving Gradient based Insertion(SGI) Attack.
The SGI attack solves the constrained optimization problem 2 with
a gradient-descent algorithm. To fit the black box setting, we first
train a substitute model C′ to approximate the detection model
CâĂŹs decision boundaries [28]. The attackers have some funda-
mental knowledge of the detection model including the input and
expected output. The substitute model C′ is trained iteratively with
the graphs and the predicted labels.
The substitute model C′ is used to craft adversarial samples.
Algorithm 3 presents pseudocode for the adversarial sample crafting
algorithm. To generate adversarial samples, the adversary computes
the following perturbation:
д = sдn( ∂JC(G,y)
∂V
) (11)
Table 1: Examples of semantic nops
NOP
PUSH %rbx POP %rbx
NOT %rbx NOT %rbx
XCHG %rax,%rax XCHG %rax,%rax
ADD $5,%r10 SUB $5,%r10
Here, V is the feature matrix, each row describes instructions in a
basic block vi of the graph, and y is the label of the CFG. Each row
of the signed gradient indicates дi , for each basic blocks or nodes,
the specific instructions list are helpful to get the CFG misclassifed.
We heuristically insert a semantic Nop that is closest to the gradient
дi into the corresponding basic block of the CFG. N is the number
of basic blocks in the CFG, and K is the number of semantic nops .
In each iteration, it injects the closet semantic nops to the sign
gradient descent. p is the norm value of the distance function ∥·∥p .
This procedure is repeated up to a maximum number of iterations
T.
5 ASSESSING THE RESILIENCE OF GRAPH
NEURAL NETWORK FOR MALWARE
DETECTION
We conduct experiments to answer the overarching research ques-
tion is: What kind of manipulations can be applied on original
CFGs to evade the malware detection models without changing
the programs’ behaviors? The goal of the proposed attacks are: 1)
they can achieve high attack rate; 2) it can generate small-scale
manipulations on original features; 3) it would not change mali-
cious behaviors. We begin by providing details about data used for
evaluation and the performance of the malware detection models.
We then evaluate the performance of four attacks. Subsequently, we
move to discuss the effects of different parameters in those attacks
and the impacts of graph size and the semantic nops.
5.1 Datasets and Malware-Detection Model
The experiments in this paper are conducted on the VXHeavens-
Dataset [51]. We installed standard packages on a x86 Windows 10
virtual machine using Ninite and Chocolatey2 package managers
and collected the benign binaries generated by those packages.
The categories of the installed packages vary including popular
applications(such as Chrome, Firefox, and Zoom), Security appli-
cations(such as Spybot2, SUPERAntiSpyware, and Malwarebytes),
Developer Tools(such as Python, Github, and PuTTY), and so on.
We use Angr, a Python framework for analyzing binaries, to extract
CFG in those datasets. After extracting CFGs, we transform the
basic blocks in CFGs to a directed graph. Because some graphs
have millions of basic blocks, it is impossible to train on the entire
graph at once due to GPU memory and training time constraints.
In our experiments, the CFGs with less than 3,000 basic blocks are
used for malware classification. Then, we mix benign programs and
malware together, and randomly select 70% samples of the whole
dataset as train dataset, 10% samples as validation dataset, 20% sam-
ples as test dataset. Table 2 describes the data distribution in the
datasets. We generated 28 semantic Nops based on rules mentioned
in section 3.2. Table 1 lists some examples of sematic nops .
Table 2: The number of benign and malicious binaries
Class Train Val Test
Benign 2822 348 830
Malware 2778 372 850
All 5600 720 1680
Table 3: The classification performance of the detection model
Model ACC FPR FNRTrain Val Test
DGCNN 98.37% 93.61% 95.77% 4.70% 3.73%
Basic GCN 97.35% 93.61% 93.92% 5.52% 6.62%
All experiments are conducted on Ubuntu 16.04, using Python 3.7
and Tensorflow 2.1 with NVIDIA GTX980 Ti Graphics Processing
Unit(GPU). We trained two graph neural networks as malware
detection models over CFG-based features: the basic GCN model
and the DGCNN model. The basic GCN model stacks four graph
convolution layers with 128, 64, 32, 16 output channels followed by a
fully-connected layer. The DGCNN model[50] leverages four graph
convolution layers with 32, 32, 32, 1 output channels, respectively
followed by a SortPooling layer to keep top 1000 nodes. Two 1-D
convolutional layers with 16 and 32 output channels followed by
one dense layer with 128 hidden units are applied to learn the graph
features. We trained two models 200 epochs with batch size 100.
The classification performance of the detection model is reported
in Table 3.
5.2 Attack Results
The main focus of the attackers is to craft adversarial samples to
fool the malware detector. We implement four attacks to generate
adversarial samples by inserting the semantic nops . The configu-
ration for those attacks is described in the following. Each attack
probes the detection model less than 30 iterations. We set 5% as
the maximum injection budget. In the SRI, SAI, and SRL attacks,
the maximum effected basic blocks in each iteration is 1250. If the
number of the nodes in a CFG is less than 1250, it will insert one
semantic nop into all basic blocks each step. The norm value of
the distance function in the SGI attack is set as 2 to calculate the
semantic nops that is close to the direction of the gradient.
For the SGI attack, we trained two substitute models using the
validation dataset to approximate the detection models[28]. The
substitute models have the same structure as the basic GCN model.
Both of them are trained for 10 epochs from scratch with CFGs and
their corresponding predicted labels. After 10 epochs, the accuracy
of the substitute model for the basic GCNmodel can reach to 85.83%
on the test dataset. Meanwhile, the substitute model for the DGCNN
model can achieve an accuracy of 81.42%.
For the SRL attack, we used the RMSProp algorithm with mini-
batches of size 512. We trained the model with malicious samples
in the training dataset. Each graph can query the detection model
for at most 30 steps. We used a replay memory of 3000 most recent
queries. The policy during training was decaying ϵ-greedy with ϵ
decaying linearly from 1 to 0.1 over the first 3000 queries, and fixed
at 0.1 thereafter. The agent drops actions that returned negative
actions with probability 50% instead of keeping every queries.
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Figure 2: SRL attack on the basic GCN model
We performed independently SRI and SAI attacks 10 times to
obtain the average success attack rates and the percentage of in-
jected instructions. The performance of those attacks are provided
in Table 4. SRI attack can achieve 48.87% success rate on basic
GCN model while inserting instruction by 0.96% on average, and
72.25% on DGCNN model with 1.06% average feature changed. The
SGI attack achieves a misclassification rate 41.22% on Basic GCN
model and 83.08% on the DGCNN model. Overall, SAI and SRL
attacks have shown, in general, a good performance. The SAI attack
achieves more than 96% attack rate with fewer feature changed.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 are the performance of the SRL attack on
the basic GCN model and the DGCNN model. We run the attack
on two models 10 times and periodically compute the attack rate
on the validation dataset every 10,000 queries during training. The
bold lines are averages over 10 independent learning trials. The
shaded area presents the maximum and minimum values of ten
trials. Attacks on the basic GCN model can converge smoother and
faster. The results shows the SRL attack is able to train a deep Q
network in a stable manner. The SRL attack on both models can
achieve misclassification rate as high as 100%.
In practice, SRI attacks took about more time to generate an sam-
ple on average compared with SAI attack. That is because SAI attack
drops some transformation and can mislead the detection model
within fewer iteration. The SGI attack cost longer time because of
the gradient calculation.
Table 4: The performance of different attacks
Attack Basic GCN DGCNNAR(%) FG(%) GT(s) AR(%) FG(%) GT(s)
SRI 45.58 0.96 0.98 72.25 1.28 0.65
SAI 97.27 0.54 0.38 96.74 0.62 0.33
SGI 41.22 1.99 3.31 83.08 1.22 3.43
SRL 100.0 0.17 0.37 100.0 0.23 0.08
∗AR=Attack Rate
∗FG=Average Number of Features Inserted
∗GT=Generating Time in Seconds per Sample
5.2.1 Attack Parameters. In this section, we discuss the impacts
of different parameters in those attacks.
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Figure 3: SRL attack on the DGCNN model
Figure 4 is SRI, SAI and SRL attacks with different effected basic
blocks in each iteration. The iteration and the insertion budget
are set as 30 and 5% respectively. Each attacks are executed with
different number of the effected basic blocks as input. One can
immediately see that more effected basic blocks do not significantly
improve the attack rate after it reaches to 1250. Sometimes the
attack rate even reduce slightly. That is because when the effected
basic blocks are more than the node size of the CFG, it inserts one
dead instruction to all basic blocks. With more effected basic blocks,
the attack rate tends to depend on other factors such as the number
of iteration and the insertion budget.
Figure 5 and Figure 6 are four attacks on two detection models
with different maximum iteration and insertion budget. Generally,
attacks with more iteration and higher budget are more successful.
The evasion rate of those attacks plateaus at about 30 iterations. And
most attacks can obtain a good performance when insertion budges
reach to 5%. As one would expect, more iteration and insertion
budget change more features to generate an adversarial sample.
For example, for SGI attack on the DGCNN model, the average
changed features increase from 0.57% to 1.22% with the rise of the
insertion budget. With large manipulation on the original CFGs, the
generated samples are more likely to mislead the detection model.
For the SRL attack, even though the insertion budget is small e.g.
1%, it can achieve a high evasion rate close to 100%. However, it is
highly depended on the initial value of the action-value function. If
the evasion rate before training the Q function is less than 40%, most
queries in the earlier training process will get negative rewards,
and consequentially need more time to train the Q function for
a good result. Moreover, smaller iteration and insertion budget
restrict the length of action sequences, which may also reduce
the number of queries with positive rewards. Therefore, although
a smaller number of iteration and insertion budget can obtain a
good performance, it may take longer time to train the Q function
because most queries in the beginning of the training process return
negative rewards.
5.2.2 Graph Size Impact. We investigate the impact of the graph
size by separating the test dataset into four groups according to
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Figure 4: The impacts of the effected basic blocks
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Figure 6: The impacts of insertion budget
the the number of the nodes in a graph and observing the misclas-
sification rate. The goal is to understand the impact of graph size
on misclassification rate. The results are shown in Table 5. As it
can be seen in Table 5, we calculate the first quartile, the median,
and the third quartile of the graph size to group the test dataset.
For the SGI attack, larger graph significantly achieve higher eva-
sion rate. However, for other attacks, we could not observe an any
meaningful relationship between the graph size and the evasion
rate. That indicates the evasion rate is not highly dependent on the
graph size.
Table 5: The impacts of graph size(%)
Attack Basic GCN DGCNN25% 50% 75% 100% 25% 50% 75% 100%
SRI 44.44 51.44 47.44 53.64 70.81 71.29 77.94 79.47
SAI 98.06 98.55 98.97 94.79 94.73 95.83 97.43 95.78
SGI 10.14 17.30 54.59 86.97 54.02 82.87 84.10 88.94
SRL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
5.2.3 The Impacts of Dead Instructions. Different dead instruc-
tions have different effects on attacks. To evaluate the impacts of
dead instructions, we investigate the performance of a single dead
instruction. Some results can be found in Table 6. With a certain
semantic Nop, sometimes the SAI attacks can not achieve the same
performance as the SRI attacks because it rejects some insertion
and consequentially reduces the action sequences. With some dead
instructions, such as NOT ,NOT , three attacks on different model
have divergent attack rate. Even through those instructions may
not be helpful to mislead the GCN model, the SAI, SGI and SRL
attacks can reject those instructions or locate a better combination
to deceive the detection model.
5.3 Potential Mitigations
Our proposed attacks achieved high misclassification rates to fool
graph neural networks for malware detection. In this section, we
discuss potential mitigation methods to make malware detection
robust against evasion by our attacks.
To defend against those attacks, we added the adversarial sam-
ples generated by three attack to the training dataset and retrained
the detection model. For each attack, we randomly selected 500
adversarial samples and added them into the training dataset. After
200 epochs, models can obtain similar accuracy as their original
performance, shown as Table 7. For SRI, SAI and SGI attack, the at-
tack rate of the retrained model decreases significantly as presented
in Table 8. Even though this defense method is effective, the cost
of retraining the detection model is significant if the training set is
large. Also, for the SRL attack, adversarial samples remain a risk,
and we recommend malware detection systems combine multiple
Table 6: The Impacts of Dead Instructions(%)
ID Sematic Nops Basic GCN DGCNNSRI SAI SGI SRI SAI SGI
0 nop 39.97 39.22 41.34 96.04 81.23 95.67
1 push,pop 2.24 2.36 2.24 62.09 32.59 60.86
2 not,not 0.12 0.12 0 54.19 45.18 50
3 xchg,xchg 0 0 0 9.01 3.08 9.38
4 sub,add 0 0 0 1.23 0.24 1.11
Table 7: The classification performance after retraining the model
Model ACC FPR FNRTrain Val Test
DGCNN 98.71% 93.61% 95.23% 3.41% 6.14%
Basic GCN 98.96% 93.33% 94.70% 4.94% 5.66%
Table 8: Defense
Attack Basic GCN DGCNNAR(%) FG(%) AR(%) FG(%)
SRI 1.05 0.91 2.02 1.01
SAI 13.24 0.94 16.96 0.94
SGI 0.24 2.94 0.73 1.03
SRL 27.22 1.20 85.74 0.83
detection algorithms to decrease the susceptibility against those
attacks.
6 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial samples are generated by adding imperceptible pertur-
bations to original samples to deceive deep learning algorithms.
Attacks can be grouped into three scenarios based on their knowl-
edge: white-box attack, black-box attack, and semi-white (gray) box
attack.
In the white-box scenario, attacks have access to the architecture
and parameters of the neural networks.
The FGSM attack[17] is a fast method to generate adversarial
samples x ′ using the following equation:
x ′ = x + ϵsдn(▽x J (θ ,x , l)) (12)
where x is the original input of the neural network, and l is its
corresponding label, ϵ is the perturbation threshold, siдn(·) denotes
the sign function, J is the loss function
Carlini and Wagner [5] proposed gradient-based attacks to gen-
erate adversarial samples by calculating one back-propagation step.
The perturbations are generated by minimizing the following func-
tion:
loss(f (x + r ), l) + ϵ · ∥r ∥2 (13)
where x is the original input, r is the perturbation, l is the target
label, and the parameter ϵ is for tuning the L2-norm. loss(·) is a
function to measure the distance between the target label and the
output of the neural network with the perturbed input.
In a black-box attack setting, the architecture parameters of the
neural network is unavailable to attackers. Attackers only have
the query access to generate adversarial samples. Papernot et al.
[29] design a substitute neural network to fit the black-box neural
network and then generated adversarial examples according to the
substitute neural network. This method assumes the attackers can
only obtain the label information from the target neural network.
Zeroth order optimization based black box attack has a different
assumption that the attackers have access to the prediction confi-
dence (score) from the target neural networks[8]. It provides the
following function to ’scrape‘ the gradient information:
∂F (x)
∂xi
=
F (x + hei ) − F (x − hei )
2h (14)
Here xi is the i-th component of a sample x , ei is the standard basis
vector, h is a small constant to scrape the gradient information from
the target neural network F (·).
In the grey-box setting, attackers have access to the the struc-
ture of the target model. Generative Adversarial Network(GAN)
is introduced to generate adversarial examples directly from the
generative network[15, 42].
6.1 Attacks on Graph based Models
Graph-based data are ubiquitous in many real-world applications,
such as social networks, protein analysis, and knowledge graph
analysis. Unlike to image data, it is harder to generate adversarial
samples on graph-based data for two reasons: 1) the graph structure
is discrete so we cannot use infinitesimal small perturbation, and 2)
large graphs can not easily be verified visually.
Chen et al.[7] introduced a network embedding attack that uses
the gradient information of the adjacency matrix to iteratively add
or delete some key links. ZÃĳgner et al.[52] first proposed a method
Nettack to perturb the graph data to perform poisoning attack on
GCN model. Dai et al.[13] propose a reinforcement learning based
attack method RL-S2V that learns to modify the graph structure
by sequentially adding or dropping edges from the graph. Wang
et al.[41] developed two algorithms, Greedy and Greedy-GAN, to
attack GCN models by adding fake nodes into the original graph.
Sun et al.[38] extend the idea of RL-S2V to sequentially add fake
nodes, introduce fake links, and modify the labels of fake nodes.
6.2 Attacks on Malware Detection
Adversarial malware generation contrasts with previous applica-
tions of adversarial sample generation in computer vision because
most features in malware detection involve in discrete data, which
means the gradients to train the generator are zero almost every-
where. There are two constraints for adversarial malware genera-
tion: 1) large-scale manipulations on original features may change
the program’s functionality; 2) generated samples should not re-
move original features[40].
Multiple attacks are introduced to evade deep learning models.
Some of them modify original malware, for example, add benign
code to malware, to mimic benign program[21–23, 33, 36, 37, 44].
Anderson et al.[4] modify PE header metadata, Section metadata,
Import and Export Table metadata, etc. by reinforcement learning
to evade static PE machine learning malware models. Other attacks
focus on the gradient of the detection model or the substitute model
to tweak some features of the target model, e.g. manipulating the file
header [3, 16, 18, 30, 34]. The evolutionary computation techniques
are used to develop new variants of mobile malware[1].
Although researchers have been developing graph based neural
network models for malware detection, no systematic study on
whether such models can be attacked. Differently from some of the
prior works, e.g. [3, 36], our target models are graph based deep
learning models from CFGs. Perhaps most closely related to our
work on evading CFG based deep learning model[2]. First, instead
of using graph neural networks, they extracted some indicators
such as closeness centrality, density, and betweenness centrality, to
represent the CFG and constructed a detectionmodel. Because those
features are continuous value, they can directly apply methods of
white box attack to generate adversarial samples. However, those
generated adversarial samples can not be reverted to CFG andmight
change the structure, features, and consequently, the programs’
behaviors. The graph embedding and augmentation method they
proposed reply on expert experience onmodify the CFG and doesn’t
consider the guidance of the malware detection.
7 CONCLUSION
We proposed a black-box attack to iteratively insert the semantic
Nops into the original CFG to fool malware detection models while
keeping the program functionality intact. The automatically gener-
ated samples will not only extend the boundary of the detection
model by augmenting training data but also uncover potential blind
spots of the models. We verified the attack effectiveness for graph
neural networks on malware detection and compared it with other
adopted attacks. We analyzed that the impacts of different attack
parameters including the effected basic blocks, the number of itera-
tions, the insertion budgets, and the dead instructions. Finally, we
presented a defense method against those attacks.
Our work focuses on attacks targeting graph neural networks
for malware detection using CFGs as input. We believe the method
can be applied to other ML models based on sequential data. For
example, prior work studied the effectiveness of instruction se-
quences and API Call sequences as features for malware detection
[33]. By inserting semantic nops into the instruction sequences it
can potentially mislead the RNN based detection models. Another
potential extensions for the SRL attack is to leverage other code
obfuscation techniques such as instruction substitution and code
transposition as alternative actions.
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A APPENDIX
Algorithm 2: Semantics-preserving Random Insertion Attack
against Malware Detection
Input: C(·), G =< V ,E > , y˜, NopsList , topk , niters , ∆
Output: G˜ =< V˜ ,E >
i ← 0 ;
G˜ ← G ;
while argmax(C(G˜)) , y˜ and i < niters do
node_mask ← RandomBasicBlock(V˜ , topk) ;
X ← RandomInstruction(NopsList);
V˜ ← V ∗ node_mask + (V + X ) ∗ node_mask ;
G ′ ←< V˜ ,E >;
if Di f f (G ′,G) <= ∆ then
G˜ ← G ′;
end
i ← i + 1
end
Algorithm 3: Semantics-preserving Gradient based Insertion
attack against malware detection
Input: C(·), G =< V ,E >, y, y˜, NopsList , niters , ∆, N , K
Output: G˜ =< V˜ ,E >
i ← 0 ;
G˜ ← G ;
while arдmax(C(G˜)) , y˜ and i < niters do
д ← sдn( ∂ JC(G,y)∂V );
for i ← 1 to N do
for j ← 1 to K do
dj ←
дi − NopsListjp ;
end
Xi ← NopsListarдmin(dj );
end
V˜ ← V + X ;
G ′ ←< V˜ ,E >;
if Di f f (G ′,G) <= ∆ then
G˜ ← G ′;
end
i ← i + 1
end
